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* Professor of Law, Golden Gate University School of Law.
1. Buckley v. Chadwick, 45 Cal. 2d 183, 187 (1955) (hereinafter “Buckley”).
2. Id.
3. Buckley v. Chadwick, 274 P.2d 673, 675 (Cal. Ct. App. 1954) (hereinafter “Buckley
Appeal”). No copy of this opinion exists in the official reports of the California Courts
of Appeal. The California Rules of Court allow the Supreme Court to “depublish” a Court
of Appeal opinion when the Supreme Court grants review or if requested by an inter-
ested party. Once the opinion is “depublished” it can no longer be cited, but still exists
in the unofficial, regional reporter, here Pacific Reporter. Cal. R. Ct. 8.1105(d)(replacing
R. 976 as of Jan. 1, 2007). The Supreme Court’s opinion refers to the partner only as
“one McDonald.”
4. See Buckley, 45 Cal. 2d at 187 (1955).
Justice Carter, Contributory
Negligence andWrongful
Death: A Call to Get Rid of a
“Bad LawWith Bad Results”
By Michael A. Zamperini*
Introduction and Case Background
Allen Buckley was killed on April 19, 1951 in an accident on a construc-
tion site in Southern California.1 Mr. Buckley was a self-employed contractor
who owned two dump trucks but rented cranes and other equipment for his
job of furnishing dirt and other materials to constructions sites.2 Approxi-
mately a month before his death, he entered into a partnership with B.F. Mc-
Donald to provide 5,000 yards of dirt for a construction project.3 The partners
rented a “drag line crane” from Fred Chadwick under an oral contract.4 Part
of the contract provided that the partners would “provide an experienced oiler
in the operation of the crane and also that Mr. McDonald would operate [the
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5. Id.
6. See Buckley Appeal, 274 P.2d at 675.
7. Id.
8. See Buckley, 45 Cal. 2d at 188. Even though the widow waived her rights to any re-
covery in favor of the minor son, the suit continued in her name and the published opin-
ions refer to the plural “plaintiffs.” Id. at 186. Apparently Mr. McDonald was not sued.
9. Id. at 188. Mr. Chadwick had merely pleaded “contributory negligence” and had not
specifically pleaded that the alleged negligence of either Mr. McDonald or the oiler could be
imputed to Mr. Buckley. While the appellate court acknowledged that plaintiffs could raise
the omission of this defense in his answer, that court also decided that plaintiffs had waived
their right to raise such an objection in a timely manner, because it was only brought to the
court’s attention in plaintiffs’ motion for a new trial. See Buckley Appeal, 274 P.2d at 677.
10. Id. at 675.
11. Id.
crane].” Mr. Chadwick also represented that the crane was in “first class con-
dition.”5
On April 19, 1951, the two partners were at a dirt pit. Mr. McDonald was
operating the crane. He filled the bucket of the crane with dirt, raised the
bucket to the top of the crane boom, swung the boom and its load over the bed
of one of the dump trucks, and then lowered the bucket and released it to de-
posit the dirt into the bed of the truck.6 While Mr. McDonald was operating
the crane, Mr. Buckley was standing on the running board of the dump truck.
Without warning, the boom cable suddenly broke. The boom fell, striking Mr.
Buckley on the head and killing him instantly.7
Mr. Buckley’s widow, Dorothy, on behalf of herself and their minor son
Bruce Allen Buckley, sued Mr. Chadwick in Los Angeles Superior Court. The
suit alleged two causes of action: breach of warranty, and negligence in caus-
ing the wrongful death of Allen Buckley.8
Mr. Chadwick defended by pleading contributory negligence. He alleged
that even if he had been negligent in maintaining the crane, any negligence
on the part of Mr. Buckley personally, or on the part of any of his agents (Mr.
McDonald and the man who was the oiler for the crane) would bar any re-
covery for wrongful death by Mr. Buckley’s heirs.9
Conflicting evidence was introduced at trial. Mr. McDonald testified that
as a crane operator for twenty-seven years, he had never experienced a cable
break in such a manner. He also testified as to his (and the oiler’s) proper use
of the crane.10 Karl Taroldsen, plaintiffs’ expert witness, expressed the opinion
that the cable “was just worn out,” and that such wear could not have been
caused within the six days that the partnership had been using the crane.11
Defendant’s experts, however, maintained that the oiler should have checked
the cable every day and reported any wear or defect. They also claimed that the
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12. Id. at 675–76.
13. Nor does it seem that any such evidence existed; the defense of “contributory neg-
ligence” rested on the negligence of Mr. McDonald and the oiler. Because they were the
agents of Mr. Buckley, the trial court ruled that their negligence would be imputed to Mr.
Buckley. Thus, at most, Mr. Buckley was “vicariously” rather than “primarily” negligent.
14. See Buckley Appeal, 274 P.2d at 673. No challenges were made to the doctrine of con-
tributory negligence. Plaintiffs did contend that the trial court was mistaken in charging the
jury about imputed negligence. The Court of Appeal, however, held that “there seems no
room for doubt that under all existent California authority, the contributory negligence of
the deceased, or those for whom he is responsible, will bar recovery in a wrongful death ac-
tion. The trial court’s instructions were therefore not erroneous.” Id. at 680. Interestingly,
the Court of Appeal opinion was authored by Stanley Mosk sitting pro tem. Twenty-one
years later, Justice Mosk was a member of the California Supreme Court. He concurred in
that Court’s opinion abolishing contributory negligence in Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 13 Cal. 3d
804, 830–32 (1975), although he dissented in part concerning the Court’s reluctance to use
a fair and reasoned approach to applying judgments retroactively or prospectively.
15. These alleged errors included that defendant’s claim of imputed negligence was not
pleaded in his answer (Buckley v. Chadwick, 45 Cal. 2d 183, 188–89 (1955)), that imputed
negligence should not have been applied (id. at 189–90, 288 P.2d 12, 15–16), that con-
tributory negligence should not be used as a defense to an action for wrongful death (id. at
190–201), and that the trial judge erroneously curtailed plaintiffs’ preemptory challenges
in selecting the jury (id. at 201–03).
16. “[I]t is obvious that there is no basis in law or fact for the statement of the majority
that appellant was required to make an affirmative showing that he was prejudiced as a re-
sult of the error committed by the trial court in denying appellant his statutory right to ex-
ercise the peremptory challenge. . . .” Id. at 207 (Carter, J. dissenting). In fact, Justice Carter
end of the cable where the break occurred showed abrasive damage from faulty
winding and unwinding. All of this, they claimed resulted in enough damage
during the six days that the partnership had the crane to cause the cable to
break under the strain.12 No published opinion indicates that Mr. Buckley him-
self affirmatively did anything that could be considered contributorily negli-
gent, such as standing too close to the crane, or not properly inspecting it.13
Following a trial before Judge Allan W. Ashburn, the jury found in favor of
defendant. Plaintiffs appealed and the Court of Appeal affirmed.14 Plaintiffs
then appealed to the California Supreme Court.
The California Supreme Court’s majority opinion also affirmed the judgment
for the defendant. The opinion addressed the various grounds the plaintiffs
urged for appeal, both procedural and substantive, and rejected all of them.15
Justice Jesse W. Carter and Justice Roger J. Traynor dissented because they be-
lieved the trial judge’s ruling on plaintiffs’ peremptory challenges to the jury
members was incorrect and constituted reversible error, without the plaintiffs
having to prove they were prejudiced by that ruling.16 Justice Carter also wrote
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would dissent a second time, but only on the jury selection issue, when the California Supreme
Court later denied a petition for rehearing. Buckley v. Chadwick, 45 Cal. 2d 283 (1955).
a lone dissent that contributory negligence should not be a defense in an ac-
tion for wrongful death. On this point, as discussed below, he would ultimately
be vindicated.
DISSENT (Concerning Contributory Negligence)
Carter, J. I dissent.
I cannot agree with the reasoning of the majority that the contributory neg-
ligence of a decedent either should, or must be imputed to the heirs of said
decedent in a wrongful death action.
The cause of action for wrongful death is wholly statutory; it is entirely sep-
arate and distinct from any cause of action which the decedent (had he lived)
might have had. (Citations omitted).
The majority opinion, speaking of the three amendments to section 377 of the
Code of Civil Procedure, states that “At no time, however, has contributory neg-
ligence been abolished as a defense.” Contributory negligence was never specifi-
cally mentioned by the section as a defense—although the appellate courts assumed
that contributory negligence on the part of the decedent would bar recovery by
his heirs or personal representative. The language in the original enactment which
could have been said to imply that the decedent’s contributory negligence was a
defense to an action brought by the personal representative was deleted when sec-
tion 377 of the Code of Civil Procedure was enacted giving to the heirs also the
right to sue. Judge Paul Nourse (42 Cal.L.Rev. 310 et seq.) points out that “Upon
the grounds that the cause of action for wrongful death is a new cause of action
and separate and distinct from any cause of action that the deceased might have
had, it has been uniformly held that the admissions of the decedent against his
interests and which might tend to establish his negligence, are not admissible
against his heirs in an action brought under Section 377 of the Code of Civil Pro-
cedure. (Citations omitted). It seems anomalous to hold that the negligence of
the decedent will defeat a cause of action for his death, and to hold that his own
admissions may not be used as proof of his negligence.
“The Legislature not having made the decedent’s freedom from negligence a
condition upon the cause of action which it created, the Courts are without power
to graft such conditions upon that cause of action. To do so would be to amend
the statute by judicial decree. [Cal. Const., art. III, §1; (citations omitted).]”
Section 1714 of the Civil Code is the section which contains the defense of
contributory negligence. That section provides that “Everyone is responsible,
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not only for the result of his wilful acts but also for injuries occasioned to an-
other by his want of ordinary care or skill . . . except so far as the latter has, wil-
fully or by want of ordinary care, brought the injuries upon himself. . . .” (Emphasis
added.) Judge Nourse notes that “It is clear that there is nothing in the section
which allows one, who through negligence has injured another, to escape lia-
bility because someone other than the person injured by his negligence con-
tributed to that injury. Yet this is what occurs when a defendant tortfeasor is
permitted to plead the negligence of the decedent in an action for wrongful
death founded upon Section 377 of the Code of Civil Procedure. It is the heirs
of the decedent who have suffered pecuniary loss, who are the persons injured
by the act of the tortfeasor. Certainly it cannot be said that the widow and
minor children of a man killed by the negligence of another have, in the words
of Section 1714, ‘wilfully or by want of ordinary care brought the injuries’
upon themselves.” (Emphasis added.)
Judge Nourse notes that the reasons given for the defense of contribu-
tory negligence in the decided cases have no application to an action for
wrongful death. Quoting from Fujise v. Los Angeles Ry. Co., 12 Cal.App.
207, 211 [107 P. 317], it appears that “In order that contributory negligence
shall prevent the recovery of damages for a personal injury, it must appear
that the negligence is that of the injured person or of someone over whom
he exercised some control. . . . The reason for the rule which so relieves the
defendant from the payment of damages for his negligence where the plain-
tiff has contributed to the injury by his own negligence, as it is applied in
this state, is based upon an argument of convenience, to wit, the impossi-
bility of successfully apportioning the damages between the parties, and not
for the reason that the law relieves the defendant from responsibility merely
because the injured party has contributed to the result by his own negli-
gence or wrongful act.”
Judge Nourse points out that in an action for wrongful death the plaintiffs
have brought no injury upon themselves. The fact that the person, whose death
gives rise to their cause of action, has by his own negligence, in some degree
“however slight” contributed to his own death, is, under the language of the
court just quoted, or under the provisions of section 1714 of the Civil Code of
no more moment than the contributing negligence of some third person.
An additional distinction between the ordinary tort action and a wrongful
death action are the damages recoverable: In the ordinary personal injury ac-
tion, the plaintiff recovers for medical expenses, pain or suffering, together
with compensatory damages; in a wrongful death action, the heirs may re-
cover damages for the injuries they have sustained: loss of support, society,
comfort and protection.
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17. Id. at 206.
18. “[T]he rationalization never proceeded any further than to posit a voluntary act
by the defendant . . . nothing could save the defendant from civil responsibility . . . In
other words, there has never been a time, in English law, since . . . the early 1500s, when
the defendant in [a tort action] was not allowed to appeal to some standard of blame or
fault in addition to and beyond the mere question of his act having been voluntary.”
John H. Wigmore, Responsibility for Tortious Acts: Its History—II, 7 Harv. L. Rev. 383,
443 (1894).
Judge Nourse “submits” that the basis for the defense of contributory neg-
ligence is entirely lacking in an action for wrongful death even though the cases
dealing with actions under section 377 of the Code of Civil Procedure have
held that contributory negligence was a defense. He says that if the cases are
wrong, this court should not hesitate to overrule them.
I agree with the logic and reasoning set forth by Judge Nourse; I feel that the
cases holding contributory negligence a defense in wrongful death actions are
wrong and should be overruled and that the error should not be perpetuated
as is being done in the instant case. . . .
Comment
Justice Carter’s dissenting opinion focuses on the legislative history of Cal-
ifornia’s laws concerning negligence and wrongful death and the role of the
judiciary in interpreting legislation. It explicitly points out the inequities im-
posed by allowing a decedent’s imputed contributory negligence to bar a wrong-
ful death suit brought by the decedent’s heirs. As Justice Carter wrote in his
dissent, cases applying such a rule are just “wrong and should be overruled.”17
While this is a particularized application to one distinct cause of action, it rests
on the historical development of basic tort liability when conduct falls below
a particular standard of care. His opinion channels the development of liabil-
ity based on a defendant’s negligence, a plaintiff ’s concurrent negligence, ei-
ther primary or imputed, and the tort of wrongful death. The opinion combines
these concepts and implicitly foreshadows one of the most important developments
in tort law in the twentieth century: the near universal replacement of con-
tributory negligence with comparative negligence.
Negligence as a tort cause of action gradually evolved from a system of sim-
ple “strict liability” that the person who caused an injury should pay for it, rather
than the person who was injured. Thus, fault was not a prerequisite to a find-
ing of liability.18 As society moved from a feudal and agrarian model to a com-
mercial enterprise one, the establishment of negligence as a cause of action
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19. See generally Frank E. Maloney, From Contributory to Comparative Negligence: A
Needed Law Reform, 11 U. Fla. L. Rev. 135, 137 (1958) (pointing out that business liabil-
ity insurance was virtually unknown up through the 19th Century).
20. King’s Bench 1809, 11 East 59.
21. Id. at 61.
22. Wex S. Malone, The Formative Era of Contributory Negligence, 41 Ill. L.Rev. 151 (1946);
see alsoWilliam L. Prosser, Comparative Negligence, 41Cal. L. Rev. 1, 3 (1953) (originally pub-
lished at 51 Michigan Law Review 465 in 1953 as one of the Thomas M. Cooley lectures deliv-
ered by Dean Prosser at the University of Michigan Law School in early 1953).
23. One of the earlier reported cases cited to Butterfield as being “very strong” in holding
that “to entitle the plaintiff to an action for damages resulting from a nuisance he must show
that he acted with common and ordinary caution.” Smith v. Smith, 19 Mass. (2 Pick.) 621,
624 (1824). In Smith, plaintiff claimed damages to his horse because defendant negligently al-
lowed wood to project from his wagon on a public highway that the plaintiff ’s horse ran into;
defendant successfully showed a lack of ordinary case on plaintiff ’s part because the horse
was, once again, being ridden “hard,” although this time in the dark; see generally Robert J.
Kaczorowski, The Common-Law Background of Nineteenth-Century Tort Law, 51Ohio St. L.J.
1127, 1193–98 (1990) (discussing early development of contributory negligence in America).
24. A “reception statute” adopts or receives the common law of England into the state’s
common law. For example: “The common law of England, so far as it is not repugnant to or
inconsistent with the Constitution of the United States, or the Constitution or laws of this State,
is the rule of decision in all the courts of this State.” Cal. Civ. Code §22.2 (West 1982).
represented a validation of the legal rights of an individual against an imper-
sonal business entity. However, the laissez faire economic paradigm of the 16th
and 17th centuries encouraged entrepreneurial businesses, and feared that the
prospect of financially crippling liability from negligence suits would adversely
affect the entire industrial revolution.19 Thus, a parallel doctrine soon developed
to limit liability based on the plaintiff ’s own misconduct or negligence. The doc-
trine, contributory negligence, basically holds that if a plaintiff ’s negligence com-
bines with the negligence of the defendant, then the plaintiff ’s cause of action is
barred. Thus, although negligent in causing harm to the plaintiff, the defendant
has no legal liability. One of the earliest cases using this principle, Butterfield v.
Forrester,20 involved a defendant who negligently placed a pole across part of a
public road. At twilight, the plaintiff on horseback was “riding hard” (fast and
violently) and failed to observe and avoid the pole. The plaintiff was injured and
sued the defendant for negligence. The opinions of Justice Bayley and Chief Jus-
tice Lord Ellenborough are short and concise: a defendant’s fault does not excuse
a plaintiff from using ordinary care.21 Curiously enough, the opinion does not
cite any case precedent or statutory authority, but merely takes the position that
a delinquent plaintiff cannot recover even if the defendant is at fault.22
This English doctrine transferred to the American judicial system.23 In ad-
dition to many states having “reception statutes,”24 at least one author has
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25. See Wex S. Malone, The Formative Era of Contributory Negligence, 41 Ill. L. Rev.
151, 152 (1946). Indeed, many cases that established and defined contributory negligence
involved suits against railroads. “One who by his negligence has brought an injury upon
himself cannot recover damages for it. Such is the rule of the civil and of the common law.
A plaintiff in such cases is entitled to no relief.” R.R. Co. v. Jones, 95 U.S. 439, 442 (1877).
26. See generally, Francis H. Bohlen, Contributory Negligence, 21Harv. L. Rev. 233 (1908).
27. Gary T. Schwartz, Contributory and Comparative Negligence: A Reappraisal, 87 Yale
L. J. 697, 723 (1978).
28. William L. Prosser, Comparative Negligence, 41 Cal. L. Rev. 1, 28–33 (1953); see also
Victor E. Schwartz, Comparative Negligence §17.01 (4th ed. 2002). Justice Carter also ad-
dressed this justification in his dissent.
29. Near the start of the 20th Century, Justice Holmes wrote for a unanimous Supreme
Court (in another railroad case): “(N)othing is suggested by the evidence to relieve Good-
man from responsibility for his own death. When a man goes upon a railroad track he
knows that he goes to a place where he will be killed if a train comes upon him before he
is clear of the track. He knows that he must stop for the train, not the train stop for him.. . .
It seems to us that if he relies upon not hearing the train or any signal and takes no further
precaution he does so at his own risk. If at the last moment Goodman found himself in an
emergency it was his own fault that he did not reduce his speed earlier or come to a stop.”
B & O R.R. v. Goodman, 275 U.S. 66, 69–70 (1927) (emphasis added).
30. Restatement (Second) of Torts, §§479, 480 (1965); Hoy v. Tornich, 199 Cal. 545, 553
(1926); see also Brandelius v. City & County of S.F., 47 Cal. 2d 729, 739–40, 746 (1957) (an-
other case where Justice Carter dissented because “I am more confused, after reading the
opined that the doctrine took a firm hold in America in order to help develop
mass transportation systems, particularly the rise of the railroads.25
Even if not explicitly explained in the early cases, contributory negligence was
justified for several policy reasons, such as 1) plaintiff ’s act broke the chain of
causation created by defendant’s negligence; 2) as a“joint tortfeasor,”plaintiff had
to indemnify defendant; 3) plaintiff ’s own negligence operated as an assumption
of the risk that defendant’s negligence would cause harm;26 4) plaintiff ’s negli-
gence might put others at risk of harm;27 and 5) a belief that a jury would be“un-
reliable and irresponsible” and unable to actually apportion fault.28 However,
contributory negligence also has a basic moral rationale: to deter careless behav-
ior by accident victims, and allow only those who have been blameless to recover.29
Despite the entrenchment of contributory negligence both in England and
America, the judicial system quickly recognized that its “all or nothing” out-
come could result in unfair decisions in many circumstances. Thus, in order
to ameliorate the harsh result that comes from contributory negligence’s com-
plete bar of a plaintiff ’s action, the common law courts developed a variety of
doctrinal exceptions. Some of these exceptions include Last Clear Chance (de-
termining which party had the last in time opportunity to avoid the accident),30
Going to the Rescue (plaintiff ’s negligence in performing a necessary rescue
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majority opinion, than ever before as to when the doctrine (of last clear chance) is applica-
ble.”); Fleming James, Jr., Last Clear Chance: A Transitional Doctrine, 47 Yale L.J. 704 (1938).
31. Restatement (Second) of Torts §472 (1965); Henshaw v. Belyea, 220 Cal. 458, 461
(1934).
32. Restatement (Second) of Torts, §§481, 482 (1965); Lovett v. Hitchcock, 192 Cal.
App. 2d 806 (1962); see generally, Kenneth S. Abraham, The Forms and Functions of Tort Law,
139–43 (2d ed. 2002).
33. See Restatement (Third) of Torts: Apportionment of Liability, §3 (2000) (“Plaintiff ’s
negligence is defined by the applicable standard for a defendant’s negligence. Special ame-
liorative doctrines for defining plaintiff ’s negligence are abolished.”).
34. They still remain today in jurisdictions that continue to use contributory negligence.
See infra note 60 and accompanying text.
35. Restatement (Second) of Torts, §§462–96 (1965); Bryant v. Pac. Elec. Ry., 174 Cal.
737, 742 (1917) (approving of Nonn v. Chi. City Ry., 232 Ill. 378 (1908)).
36. A concept originating from feudal times where the serf, as opposed to the freed-
man, had no legal identity apart from the master. See John H. Wigmore, Responsibility for
Tortious Acts: Its History, 7 Harv. L. Rev. 315, 330–36 (1894).
37. A joint venture is a one-time business relationship (as opposed to an on-going part-
nership or other business association) where each joint venturer has the right to control
the other. Restatement (Second) of Torts §491 (1965); Meyers v. S. Pac. Co., 63 Cal. App.
164, 169–70 (1923); see also W. Page Keeton, Imputed Contributory Negligence, 13 Tex. L.
of person or property is excused unless it rises to the level of being reckless),31
and Assessing the Greater Degree of Blame (using corrective justice to weigh
a plaintiff ’s “mere” negligence against a defendant’s intentional conduct or
“reckless” negligence).32 Ironically, the existence of so many exceptions that
involved comparing the actions of both parties was a main force behind the grad-
ual acceptance of comparative negligence. Comparative negligence weighs not
only if a party has been negligent, but also in what degree such party con-
tributed to the subject accident.33 Even if the exceptions to contributory neg-
ligence allow a plaintiff to recover even though plaintiff also exercised some
“lack of ordinary care,” the fact remains34 that with contributory negligence
only one party will be victorious: plaintiff or defendant.
In addition to plaintiff ’s own, personal, affirmative negligence barring a
cause of action, the development of the doctrine of vicarious liability placed
a further burden on potential plaintiffs. In broad terms, the concept of vicar-
ious liability holds one liable for the negligence of another.35 This “imputed
negligence” seeks to hold one business associate liable even though that per-
son did nothing, when the active negligence of another business associate is im-
puted to the first. Thus, in the same way that traditionally the negligence of a
servant is imputed to the master,36 the negligence of one joint venturer (or
partner) is imputed to another.37
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Rev. 161, 163–69 (1935); W.D. Rollison, The “Joint Enterprise” in the Law of Imputed Neg-
ligence, 6 Notre Dame L. Rev. 172 (1931).
38. Clark v. Goodwin, 170 Cal. 527, 528 (1915).
39. See generally, Helmuth Carlyle Voss, The Recovery of Damages for Wrongful Death
at Common Law, at Civil Law, and in Louisiana, 6 Tulane L. Rev. 201 (1932); Coliseum
Motor Co. v. Hester, 43 Wyo. 298, 303–06 (1931) (discussing the historical antecedents of
wrongful death back to the Roman Empire).
40. Kramer v. S.F. Mkt. St. R.R., 25 Cal. 434, 435 (1864).
41. Cal. Civ. Proc. Code §377.60 (West 2004).
42. For example, in California, “damages may be awarded that, under all the circum-
stances of the case, may be just, but may not include (punitive damages or damages for the
heirs’ pain and suffering).” Cal. Civ. Proc. Code §377.61 (West 2004).
43. California also allows the joinder of the heirs’ wrongful death action with any action
that the decedent might have had against the defendant. Cal. Civ. Proc. Code §377.62
(West 2004).
The negligence of both parties and imputed negligence were all common
law instead of statutory concepts for determining liability. However, these
concepts found their way into the statutory cause of action for wrongful death.
The nation’s legislatures passed laws that allowed suit for wrongful death by
heirs when the defendant’s wrongful conduct results in a decedent’s ultimate
injury. No such cause of action existed at common law.38 The reason for this
situation is that one’s causes of action were considered personal and expired
on death, as well as a notion that death should not be the prompt for an heir’s
monetary recovery (i.e., “profiting from death”).39 However, wrongful death
statutes have been passed in all jurisdictions. They allow a suit, brought by rel-
atives or other statutorily designated persons who claim that the defendant’s
intentional or negligent (i.e., “wrongful”) acts resulted in the death of the
decedent.
California has had some form of a wrongful death statute since 1862.40
The current wrongful death statute, similar to the one in existence in 1955,
provides as follows: “A cause of action for the death of a person caused by
the wrongful act or neglect of another may be asserted by any of the follow-
ing persons [listed heirs] or by the decedent’s personal representative on their
behalf[.]”41
In addition, the statutory scheme specifies the types of damages the dece-
dent’s heirs can claim,42 and thus wrongful death is a new cause of action that,
while based on the death of a decedent, is not necessarily the decedent’s claim
for injuries against the defendant.43
Even though wrongful death is a statutory cause of action, California courts
have applied common law concepts of proof and liability, thus grafting negli-
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44. Another disagreement between the majority and Justice Carter concerned how to in-
terpret California’s general negligence statute in relation to the wrongful death statute. The
negligence statute provides as follows: “Everyone is responsible, not only for the result of
his willful acts, but also for an injury occasioned to another by his want of ordinary care
or skill in the management of his property or person, except so far as the latter has, will-
fully or by want of ordinary care, brought the injury upon himself. The extent of liability
in such cases is defined by the Title on Compensatory Relief.” Cal. Civ. Code §1714(a)
(West Supp. 2007) (The same statute was in effect in 1955 except it contained no “subsec-
tion (a)” and the first word “everyone” was spelled “every one.”). The majority opined that
the statute merely codified existing common law and did not limit the application of con-
tributory negligence to negligence cases or preclude its application to wrongful death ones.
Buckley v. Chadwick, 45 Cal. 2d 183, 192–93 (1955). Justice Carter, however, believed that
the statute did limit contributory negligence to negligence, as opposed to wrongful death
cases, because the plaintiffs/heirs in a wrongful death action have done nothing negligent.
Id. at 205–06. The same argument would find its way back to the California Supreme Court
when it adopted comparative negligence; the Court held that Section 1714 merely codified
existing common law without precluding further judicial development, and that the language
of the statute could easily be interpreted by the judiciary to provide for comparative negli-
gence. See Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 13 Cal. 3d 804, 813–23 (1975).
45. In contrast, for example, the Missouri wrongful death statutory scheme specifically
provides as follows: “(T)he defendant may plead and prove as a defense any defense which
the defendant would have had against the deceased in an action based upon the same act, . . .
which caused the death of the deceased, and which action for damages the deceased would
have been entitled to bring had death not ensued.” Mo. Rev. Stat. §537.085 (West 2000).
46. See Buckley, 45 Cal. 2d at 192.
47. Restatement (Second) of Torts §494 (1965) (citing the majority opinion in Buckley
v. Chadwick, 45 Cal. 2d 183 (1955) as authority); Fleming James, Jr., Imputed Contributory
Negligence, 14 La. L. Rev. 340, 357–58 (1954). Indeed, this use of negligence principles in
a wrongful death action survived the demise of contributory negligence, so that now the neg-
ligence of the decedent can block or reduce a recovery under comparative negligence. See,
e.g., Wiley v. S. Pac. Transp. Co., 220 Cal. App. 3d 177, 194 (1990).
gence (contributory and imputed) principles to the cause of action.44 The Cal-
ifornia wrongful death statute contains nothing about the acts or negligence of
the decedent as a defense,45 and that omission has been interpreted to mean that
the Legislature “left the courts of this State free to interpret and apply the statute
in the light of the common law. . . .”46
Therefore, relying on that standard of interpretation, the majority held that
if a decedent was personally or imputedly negligent in contributing to the ac-
tion that led to death, such negligence would bar a survivor’s cause of action
for wrongful death.47
Thus, when Mr. Buckley’s survivors’ appeal was accepted by the California
Supreme Court, while no evidence existed that Mr. Buckley was personally neg-
ligent, they faced precedent holding that if Mr. Buckley’s partner, Mr. McDon-
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48. See Buckley, 45 Cal. 2d at 199.
49. Id. at 200 n.5.
50. Paul Nourse, Is Contributory Negligence of Deceased a Defense to a Wrongful Death
Action?, 42 Cal. L. Rev. 310 (1954). By 1955, when Justice Carter quoted this article at
length, Paul Nourse had been elevated to the California Court of Appeal, First District.
51. Id. at 311.
52. See Buckley, 45 Cal. 2d at 206.
53. Paul Nourse, Is Contributory Negligence of Deceased a Defense to a Wrongful Death
Action?, 42 Cal. L. Rev. 310, 312–13 (1954) (quoting Fujise v. L.A. Ry., 12 Cal. App. 207
(1909)).
ald, or the “oiler” the partners employed, were negligent, then their negligence
could be imputed to Mr. Buckley and thus bar his surviving family from collecting
in a suit for wrongful death. The majority opinion extensively discusses the his-
tory of California’s wrongful death statute and avers that California cases “con-
sistently and unswervingly followed the rule” that contributory negligence of
the decedent is a valid defense in a wrongful death action.48 The opinion also points
out that as of 1955, 41 other states followed the same rule.49
In many respects, the majority opinion straight-forwardly marshals prece-
dent and then follows it to affirm the trial court’s verdict for the defendant. How-
ever, Justice Carter took a broader view of the entire situation and relied on a recent,
short law review article by Judge Paul Nourse of the Los Angeles Superior Court.50
In that article, Judge Nourse pointed out that because a cause of action for
wrongful death is totally statutory, and arises on behalf of the heirs from the
death of the decedent, it is distinct from any cause of action that the decedent
might have had against the defendant.51 Justice Carter built on this concept,
pointing out that the damages recoverable in wrongful death are vastly different
from the damages recoverable in negligence. In negligence, plaintiffs recover for
their own pain, suffering and medical expenses; in wrongful death, the survivors
are compensated for their injuries arising from being deprived of the support,
society and comfort of the decedent. Those latter damages occur no matter what
activity the decedent may have engaged in that could have contributed to death.52
However, Justice Carter did more than just disagree with the majority about
the appropriateness of allowing a defense of contributory negligence in a wrong-
ful death action. While he criticized the use of common law contributory neg-
ligence principles in a statutory cause of action for wrongful death, he also
underscored the basic unfairness of contributory negligence itself as a legal
concept. By quoting Judge Nourse (who was himself quoting a 1909 case),53 Jus-
tice Carter pointed out that unquestioningly following precedent results in
continuing a bad law and bad results. This is especially so when the reason
given for the law (contributory negligence as a defense in wrongful death) is
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54. See Buckley, 45 Cal. 2d at 206.
55. See supra notes 32–36 and accompanying text. “No one can appreciate more than
we the hardship of depriving plaintiff of his verdict and of all right to collect damages from
defendant; but the rule of contributory negligence, through no fault of ours, remains in
our law and gives us no alternative other than to hold that defendant is entitled to judg-
ment. . . .” Haeg v. Sprague, Warner & Co., 202 Minn. 425, 429 (1938).
56. See generally, William L. Prosser, Comparative Negligence, 41 Cal. L. Rev. 1 (1953);
see also Richard W. Wright, Allocating Liability among Multiple Responsible Causes: a Prin-
cipled Defense of Joint and Several Liability for Actual Harm and Risk Exposure, 21U.C. Davis
L. Rev. 1141, 1156–58 (1988).
57. W. Page Keeton, Prosser & Keeton on Torts §67 (5th ed. 1984); 6 B.E. Witkin, Sum-
mary of California Law, Torts §1327 (10th ed. 2005). While Prosser & Keeton describe vari-
ations on comparative negligence as “modified” and “slight-gross,” the “pure” form of
comparative negligence eventually adopted in California merely compares the negligence
of plaintiff and all defendants and assigns a percentage of liability or fault to all. Thus if a
plaintiff on horseback is injured when the horse trips over a pole negligently left by defen-
dant, then the trier of fact can combine the percentage of liability for all parties that had a
part in injuring the plaintiff and base the judgment on that: if a defendant is 40% liable for
leaving the pole in the road, and the plaintiff is 60% liable for not maintaining a proper
look-out or riding hard, then the plaintiff can only recover 40% of the total damages from
defendant, and is personally responsible for the remaining 60%.
58. The doctrine had long been used in the federal system both as common law, The
Schooner Catharine v. Dickinson, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 170, 177–78 (1854) (in admiralty cases
to parallel British admiralty law), and statutorily since at least 1908 for cases brought by
railroad workers under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act, 45 U.S.C.A. §53 (West 1986).
only for the administrative convenience of avoiding the difficult task of ap-
portioning liability.54 Such an argument foreshadows a way to treat both innocent
heirs and negligent defendants in a fair manner: keep the basic rules but change
contributory negligence to comparative negligence.
Compared to the harsh “all or nothing” result that contributory negligence
causes, even if several ameliorative doctrines allowed a plaintiff to recover,55 the
doctrine of comparative negligence presents a clear alternative.56 In simplest terms,
comparative negligence seeks to “compare” and apportion liability of all par-
ties to an incident and only holds each liable for a “comparative portion.”Com-
parative negligence in most instances shifts the focus of a tort case from liability
to damages. As a result, a plaintiff ’s negligence might not bar an award for
damages, but that same negligence could reduce any recovery by the percent-
age of fault attributed to the plaintiff.57
In 1955, at the time its Supreme Court decided Buckley v. Chadwick, Cali-
fornia followed the contributory negligence rule, but several states (and some
federal laws)58 had already adopted comparative principles to apportion dam-
ages and allow an injured plaintiff to recover something, even if the incident
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59. See William L. Prosser, Comparative Negligence, 41 Cal. L. Rev. 1 (1953). For a com-
prehensive history of the adoption of comparative negligence by courts or statutes, see
Thomas R. Trenkner, Annotation, Modern Development of Comparative Negligence Doc-
trine Having Applicability to Negligence Actions Generally, 78 A.L.R.3d 339 (1977 & Supp. 2006).
60. As of the end of 2006, contributory negligence as a defense survives in only 4 states:
Alabama (“[T]he majority of this Court, for various reasons, has decided that we should
not abandon the doctrine of contributory negligence, which has been the law in Alabama
for approximately 162 years.” Williams v. Delta Int’l Mach. Corp., 619 So. 2d 1330, 1333
(1993)), Maryland (Hardesty v. Am. Seating Co., 194 F. Supp. 2d 447, 450 (D. Md. 2002)),
North Carolina (Lashlee v. White Consol. Indus., 144 N.C. App. 684, 690 (2001)), and Vir-
ginia (Jenkins v. Pyles, 269 Va. 383, 388–89 (2005)). Tennessee was the most recent state to
switch from contributory to comparative negligence. McIntyre v. Balentine, 833 S.W.2d 52
(Tenn. 1992).
61. W. Page Keeton, Prosser & Keeton on Torts §67 (5th ed. 1984). Dean Prosser’s sem-
inal law review article on comparative negligence concludes: “No effort has been made in
these pages to argue the desirability of the division of damages in contributory negligence
cases. It speaks for itself, and the question always has been one of feasibility rather than of
justice.” William L. Prosser, Comparative Negligence, 41 Cal. L. Rev. 1, 37 (1953). See also
Robert D. Cooter & Thomas S. Ulen, An Economic Case for Comparative Negligence, 61
N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1067 (1986) (arguing that instead of just an intuitive fairness reason, com-
parative negligence can be justified under an efficient economic analysis). On a related note,
one exhaustive survey found that the switch from contributory negligence to comparative
negligence produced no clogged trial dockets or delayed trials, did not increase potential lit-
igation, promoted pre-trial settlement, and resulted in plaintiffs winning “a higher pro-
portion of the verdicts, but not larger ones.” Maurice Rosenberg, Comparative Negligence
in Arkansas: a “Before and After” Survey, 13 Ark. L. Rev. 89, 108 (1959).
62. Li v. Yellow Cab Co of C.A., 13 Cal. 3d 804 (1975).
63. Id. at 862 (citing Buckley v. Chadwick among other authorities) (“[T]he long-stand-
ing principle that one should not recover from another for damages brought upon one-
self . . . has been the law of this state from its beginning.”).
64. Id. at 864.
65. Id.
was partially plaintiff ’s fault.59 This near-universal switch to comparative prin-
ciples60 gradually came from a basic recognition of fairness, since contribu-
tory negligence “places upon one party the entire burden of a loss for which
two are, by hypothesis, responsible.”61
California would take another 20 years to remedy the “all or nothing” result
of contributory negligence. In Li v. Yellow Cab Company of California62 the
California Supreme Court by judicial decision, instead of the Legislature by
statute, abandoned contributory negligence,63 for reasons of “logic, practical
experience, and fundamental justice”64 in favor of comparative negligence, “a
system under which liability for damage will be borne by those whose negli-
gence caused it in direct proportion to their respective fault.”65
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66. “[P]rinciples of comparative fault . . . support an apportionment of liability among
those responsible for the loss, including the decedent, whether it be for personal injury or
wrongful death.” Horwich v. Superior Court, 21 Cal. 4th 272 (1999).
67. Similar to Justice Carter attacking the use of decedent’s contributory negligence in
wrongful death cases, using comparative negligence in wrongful death is also not without
its critics. The arguments use the same rationales: the harm to the plaintiffs/heirs is dis-
tinct from the harm to the decedent, and the plaintiffs/heirs engaged in no tortuous con-
duct. See Kevin John Marrinan, Comment, Wrongful Death Recoveries in California: Is the
Decedent’s Negligence a Defense after Li?, 11 Pac. L. J. 775 (1980)(discussing the Buckley de-
cision and Justice Carter’s dissent).
Buckley v. Chadwick would probably be decided in a different way today.
Imputed negligence and the use of decedent’s own actions as a defense in a
suit for wrongful death are still valid concepts.66 However, comparative negli-
gence would move the focus of the case to allocate responsibility and, assum-
ing they could prove some negligence by defendant, thus allow the heirs to
recover something for the loss of the decedent, even if that recovery is dimin-
ished by the vicarious negligence of a third party imputed to the decedent.67
All of these basic tort concepts, defendant’s negligence, imputed negligence
from a third party, plaintiff ’s negligence (whether contributory or compara-
tive), and the role all play in wrongful death cases are woven together in Jus-
tice Carter’s dissent. While on this issue he was “the lone dissenter,” half a
century later he is truly the voice of the majority.
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